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Empathy and Imagination in Hannah Höch 
Kay Tabernacle 
The German artist Hannah Höch (1889-1978) worked in a range of media and styles 
during a productive life as a pioneering twentieth-century modernist, but her work is 
unified to an extent by her deliberate intention to affect the viewer and to change how 
we understand reality, and to that end, empathy plays an important part. This paper 
considers how empathy might function in Höch’s work in relation to imagination, and 
also discusses an animated model of imagination, made to investigate possible 
architectures surrounding imagination and other associated psychic states, including 
empathy. The focus here is on the involvement of the body in empathy, the role 
played in empathy by imagination, and issues relating to body-image in Höch’s work. 
The body is represented in much of Höch’s work but it is often altered through 
distortions, additions or substitutions, especially in her photomontage where she cuts 
up and reassembles photographic reproductions of bodies. The resulting figures retain 
a bodily completeness but are often grotesque and sometimes disturbing. Empathy, as 
an ability to understand the feelings of others, or to establish an emotional rapport, 
involving both mind and body, as well as representations of the body; this paper aims 
to show that an embodied imagination is also involved.  
Empathy can be understood to be built into to the exercise of art in a general 
sense: the artist, as a communicator of information and feelings, inevitably has to 
imagine and understand the viewer’s feelings.  Both artist and viewer will often put 
themselves in the other’s shoes in an empathetic manner. For example, in Höch’s Boa 
Perlina (1945) a snake is drawn by collaging a photograph of a string of pearls, some 
feathery pieces of fabric and other elements;1 we can see this is not a snake, but 
understand also that it evokes the idea of a snake in Höch’s imagination. And it is 
equally clear to the viewer that Höch expects us to understand that this image evokes 
the idea of a snake to her, and that she supposes that it might do the same for us. In 
communicating this she imbues a represented object with life, animating a collection 
of representations and giving them form in our imagination.  
Another approach to the involvement of empathy in art is through the idea that the 
mind or soul and the body are at least strongly connected, if not a single entity. The 
brain is a bodily organ that might be considered as a potential location for the mind or 
soul, if it were to be found in one place and, historically, the heart has similarly been 
considered. Darwin discussed feelings as both emotions (psychological) and 
sensations (physiological) in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals 
(1872) where sensations are described as being generated in the body.2 He quotes 
Norfolk from Henry VIII addressing Cardinal Wolsey: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hannah Höch, Hannah Höch: Picture Book, trans. Brian Currid, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Green Box, 2012). 
2 ‘Mr Herbert Spencer (Essays, second series, 1863, p. 138) has drawn a clear distinction between 
emotions and sensations, the latter being “generated in our corporeal framework”. He classes as 
feelings both emotions and sensations.’ (Darwin, 1872, p. 33n)2 
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‘Some strange commotion 
Is in his brain: he bites his lips and starts; 
Stops on a sudden, looks upon the ground, 
Then, lays his finger on his temple; straight, 
Springs out into fast gait; then, stops again, 
Strikes his breast hard; and anon, he casts 
His eye against the moon: in most strange postures 
We have seen him set himself.’ 
   Hen. VIII, iii, 2.3  
Through making observations Darwin connect states of mind with habitual actions, 
and he continues, ‘[t]here are other actions which are commonly performed under 
certain circumstances, independently of habit, and which seem to be due to imitation 
or some sort of sympathy. Thus persons cutting anything with a pair of scissors may 
be seen to move their jaws simultaneously with the blades of the scissors’.4 Here, 
although emotional feelings are distinct from corporeal sensation they are linked 
through an imitative ‘sympathy’.  
Taking a physiological approach to the issue of empathy in art relies on the 
possibility that effects may be caused by art in the body of the viewer. The viewer’s 
physical reaction to art, such as to the figures within Höch’s compositions, is 
addressed by Freedberg and Gallese, who propose that embodied simulations of 
movements or feelings are part of the aesthetic response to art.5 Freedberg and Gallese 
found that a physiological reaction to paintings, sculpture or other pictorial sources 
occurs in the form of an effect in the brain of the viewer. This was found, by 
Freedberg and Gallese, to particularly be the case with depictions of figures that were 
unbalanced, pressured, destabilised or mutilated. This could be understood as an 
imaginative response to the viewer’s understanding, through either placing themselves 
empathetically in the position of the subject of the work, or by intuiting the sensations 
or emotions of the artist, for example, through the viewer’s interpretation of the 
artist’s gestures.  
The idea that in the experience of viewing art the viewer embodies an artist’s 
emotions through the physiological effect of the work on the viewer’s brain does not 
assume a universality of experience. It merely suggests the possibility of there being 
some shared experiences or expectations among groups of people. Although empathy 
is not infallible, art is a form of communication and what is transmitted could include 
information that is empathetically understood. Imagination is at work on both sides of 
the communication. In the experience of making art the artist may imagine a viewer 
for that piece and try to use their own knowledge of their own feelings and sensations 
to try to predict and project how they imagine a viewer may be affected; in the 
experience of viewing the viewer may intentionally or unintentionally come to partly 
embody part of the totality of psychic states of the artist, either through the 
involuntary physiological effects of the work or by a more deliberate attempt on their 
part to empathise. The viewer might not reach the same conclusion as the artist, and 
there might be discrepancies between the emotions and sensations of the artist and 
those of the viewer, but there may also be some concordance resulting from any 
commonality of experience or culture between artists and viewers, and at the very 
least in the sense that they both inhabit a body.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Shakespeare in Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, ed. Paul 
Ekman, 3rd ed. (London: Harper Collins, 1998), 37. First published 1872 in the UK by John Murray.	  
4 Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 40. 
5 David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese, ‘Motion, Emotion and Empathy in Esthetic Experience’, 
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 11, no. 5 (2007): 197–203. 
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In Höch’s photomontage, representations of bodies are almost routinely 
dismembered and distorted. In this way Höch appears to particularly invite the kinds 
of responses and physiological experiences discussed above and to deliberately aim to  
cause experiences and sensations in the viewer. This interpretation is supported to an 
extent by Höch’s statement, in an exhibition catalogue in 1929, that she wanted 
through her work to ‘help people to experience a richer world’, thus indicating that 
she understood her work as being directed at causing or altering the future experience 
of the viewer.6 Höch’s works are experiential in the sense that they focus often on the 
type of bodily distortions and mutilations that tend to give rise to an experience in the 
viewer. The experiential pictures created by Höch have at the same time a fictional 
status emphasised through the use of borders, evidence of cutting (Höch’s hand is 
always shown, and often accentuated), recognisability of the source material and the 
fact of its displacement. In showing the work’s fictional and constructed status, Höch 
reveals how – in their original context – these images similarly present an artifice. As 
the creator, Höch needs to imagine possible responses and to predict how her own 
aesthetic feelings might be mirrored by the viewer. Through her use of familiar mass 
reproduced material, Höch exposes the evocation of emotion through pictorial image, 
emotion which, as a social experience, relies on shared narratives.  
As well as potentially experiencing a relationship to the subject of the work, the 
viewer might also be considered to imaginatively embody the artist’s own mental 
representation of their body in the process of making. To the extent that an artist’s 
actions and processes are understood by the viewer, for example, their cutting of 
paper with scissors, their understanding of these processes may form part of an 
imaginative construction of the body-image of the artist. In The Ego and the Id (1923) 
Freud elaborates the structure of the mental apparatus, including its relationship to the 
body’s surface. The body is a factor separating the Ego from the Id: ‘[T]he ego is 
ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the 
surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of 
the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental 
apparatus.’7 The mental apparatus is described by Freud as having a surface at the 
interface with the external world, a ‘perceiving surface’.8 Freud describes an 
apparatus consisting of an Ego and an unconscious Id, ‘upon whose surface rests the 
ego’.9 The Ego is ‘first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but 
is itself the projection of a surface’.10 The mental projection of the ego, a surface 
entity that merges into the Id, onto the surface of the body creates a body-ego that is 
conterminous with the body. This is experienced by an individual as a body-image.  
The idea of body-image is addressed further by Paul Schilder in The Image and 
Appearance of the Human Body (1935), where it is described as the way our bodies 
are seen by ourselves, built up from the senses, from our visual view of parts of our 
bodies and an experience of the unity of the body.11 This body-image is constantly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Höch	  translated	  by	  Juan	  Vicente	  Aliage	  in	  Aliaga,	  ed.,	  Hannah Höch: Museo Nacional Centro de 
Arte Reina Sofía Del 20 de Enero Al 11 de Abril de 2004 (Madrid: Aldeasa, 2004), 311.	  
7 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XIX (1923-1925): The Ego and the Id and Other Works., trans. James Strachey (London: 
Hogarth and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1961), 26. This footnote in the English translation is not found 
in the German original. 
8 Freud, The Ego and the Id, 19. 
9 Ibid, 24. 
10 Ibid, 26. 
11 Paul Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. Ltd, 1935). 
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changing according to a person’s actions, emotions and motivations and, importantly 
for its relationship to empathy, it is also connected to the body-images of others: 
[T]here is from the beginning a very close connection between the body-image of ourselves and the 
body-images of others. We take parts of the body images of others into others, and push parts of our 
body-image into others. We may push our own body-images completely into others, or in some way 
there may be a continuous interplay between the body-images of ourselves and the persons around us.12 
It may be through these connections between body-images that the actions and 
postures of the figures in Höch’s art could affect the viewer’s own body-image. 
Because the mental processes that take part in perception rely on the body and cannot 
step outside of the body, there is a theoretical boundary or event horizon around the 
individual that creates their point of view. Sensory input, for example the physical 
touch of an object, is a boundary describing experience with implications for an idea 
of the self. Höch’s art is often firmly attached to the bodily experience, through her 
choice of subject, which may be an object or figure that can embody a point of view 
and in doing so give existence and experience a tangible form, albeit in the 
imagination. Schilder writes, ‘strong as the tendency may be to act towards the world 
as we see it, there is also the tendency to unite the body-image with all other body-
images’. In the case of viewing Höch’s work, this tendency to unite our body-images 
is in the context of the grotesque and impossible forms that she creates.13 The human 
parts used in Höch’s grotesque combined forms are often the most recognisable and 
most involved in sensation and in reading the emotions of others – faces and eyes – 
and the wholeness of these grotesque photomontaged figures invites a bodily 
understanding. In Grotesk (1963) the individual body parts become horrifying 
because they are de-familiarised and recombined in an unbalanced and mutilated 
form.14  There is little that is terrifying in the parts themselves, but the replacement of 
a human eye with an animal’s eye, and the reduction of both figures is disturbing. 
These creations create complex feelings as we attempt to push our own body-images 
into the forms before us and see ourselves reflected back.  
There is a difference between empathy, as an ability to intuit the feelings of 
others, putting ourselves in their shoes and imagining how they might feel, and 
identification, where someone positively associates themselves with another in an 
emotional attachment involving some level of assimilation of their characteristics. 
Identification can be found in those of Höch’s photomontages that refer to 
recognisable individuals, such as Marlene Dietrich in Marlene (1930) made in the 
same year that the film Blue Angel was released.15 The distinct forms of response – 
the direct physiological effect, responses to body-images, and identification with a 
figure within the work – may happen simultaneously. Alternatively they may alienate 
if at the same time as creating recognition and a positive association they cause 
disgust or discomfort through combining those aspects with animal forms. There 
might also be a sense of alienation created by the alterations made to the integrity of 
the body in some of the works. In works such as Flucht (Flight), from 1931, Höch 
combines human and animal forms, transforming them into images that we can 
experience bodily and which directly address our sense of self and our emotions.16 
Many of Höch’s figures use some constituent parts that are recognisably human and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Schilder, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, 235. 
13 Ibid, 255. 
14 Hannah Höch, Grotesk, Photomontage, 1963, http://tinyurl.com/nm6kbuq.	  
15 Josef von Sternberg, Der blaue Engel, 1930. 
16 Hannah Höch, Flucht (Flight), Photomontage, 1931, 
http://www.whitechapelgallery.org/shop/images/0/image12831.jpg. 
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in that way create a partial identification. These grotesque human-animal 
combinations are not simply monstrous – we still recognise something of ourselves in 
them.  
In Siebenmeilenstiefel (Seven League Boots, 1934) Höch refers to the fairy tale 
boots that enable a person to take seven league strides and move quickly through the 
landscape.17 The magical power they contain is given through the body, which 
magically adapts to fit. The readers experience the shared fear of being eaten by the 
ogre, getting lost in the forest and being abandoned.  Similarly, while looking at 
Höch’s photomontages we can identify with the fantasy involved all the more readily 
because the bodily emphasis enables to work to resonate with us. We can see 
ourselves in the characters because there is an aspect of their make up which matches 
our understanding of ourselves. Höch emphasises the body through her reference to 
the magical boots and through her use of images of a woman’s legs. Fantasy is deeply 
rooted in culturally shared pasts and these figures with their magical accompaniments 
are already common inhabitants of our minds, if that is, the viewer shares some 
cultural history with Höch. It is therefore possible that some viewers will readily 
identify with these works and extend that identification towards empathy by 
understanding, correctly or incorrectly, their felt responses as being those of the 
characters depicted, or those of the artist. 
Models of Imagination 
The second part of this paper is based on my practice as an artist and it investigates 
ways that empathy might be connected to imagination by visually modelling 
imagination in a short animation.18 This animated model treats a series of psychic 
states as being dependent on the mental production of image through imagination. It is 
a model of how imagination could work in any individual to transform psychic 
material into image-like outcomes or states and is not solely concerned with the 
specific example of how a viewer, an artist and a work of art interact with one 
another. Imagination, in this model, contributes to the total psychic material that 
creates our experiences.  It is therefore seen as essential to the processes by which the 
world and its representations are understood. The image-like outcomes of the process 
of imagination form our everyday experience, and therefore they relate to an everyday 
imagination rather than a particularly creative imagination, for example one that is 
associated with the process of making art. In this model of the architecture of psychic 
states, imagination acts as a kind of transforming conduit forming the psychic 
material into perceptual states – organising, transforming and re-assimilating distinct 
but linked processes through complex and continual interactions. The indispensability 
of imagination to everyday experience is a feature that may allow Höch’s paintings 
and collages to target shared and socially constructed realities in order to counter 
ideas of a single objective external reality. In the model (Figures 1-7), imagination is 
represented by a hollow tube, through which various psychic states may pass. The 
tube is a spatial analogy for an organising force that continually moves and transforms 
different psychic processes.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Hannah Höch, Siebenmeilenstiefel (Seven League Boots), Photomontage, 1934, http://www.design-
issue.com/die-andere-seite-des-mondes-kunstlerinnen-der-avantgarde/.	  
18 Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, video (London, 2013), 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/jfigs/figs-friday-forum/empathy/empathy-files/tabernacle-mov. 
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Figure 1. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from 
video (London 2013). 
According to this model, psychic states are separated into two groups. At one end of 
the tube are psychic states that are able to be presented to experience through images 
or image-type states. These presentable states are the image outcomes of imagination, 
such as perception, illusion, emotion and fantasy. At the other end are those more 
nebulous and abstract states: cognition, intuition, sensation, memory and empathy, 
which are not directly presentable to experience, that is, they require translation by the 
imagination first. Possible image outcomes are seen at the experience end of the tube 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from 
video (London 2013). 
Empathy is treated in this model as a directly unknowable psychic state that requires 
the process of imagination in order to become formed into an image-like outcome 
Think Pieces: A Journal of the Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences 1 (1) ‘Empathy’, 18 – 27 
DOI: 10.14324/111.2058-492X.003	  	  
	   24	  
which can be presented to experience, perhaps as an emotion or an understanding 
which functions as an image, although not necessarily a visual image. The action is 
greatly simplified: directly unknowable psychic states such as sensation move into 
and through the tube where they are transformed by imagination into image states 
(Figures 3 and 4). 
 
 
Figure 3. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from 
video (London 2013). 
 
 
Figure 4. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from video 
(London 2013). 
Sensation, for example, enters the imagination tube and can be transformed into a 
variety of image outcomes, given here as perception and illusion. In this model, 
imagination is the activation mechanism that forms the psychic material into a 
perceptual condition. When empathy enters the tube it is transformed into emotion 
(Figures 5 and 6). 
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Figure 5. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from 
video (London 2013). 
 
Figure 6. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from 
video (London 2013). 
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Throughout the process there is a constant back-drift of psychic material from the 
image outcome end of the tube to be recycled (Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Kay Tabernacle, Models of Imagination: The Long Tube of Smarties, frame from 
video (London 2013). 
Höch’s work exceeds superficial presentations of image and introduces deeply 
transformative, complex and dynamic relationships between mental images, including 
body-images, and a relative or subjective reality.  Empathy can be involved in this 
linking and sharing of the material of imaginations between people. Imagination can 
be understood to be radicalised by Höch through her stated overarching intention to 
alter our assumptions about what she sees as a constructed and mythical ideal of a 
fully rationalised world. In a catalogue text for a group show in Berlin called 
Visionaries or Dreamers, Höch writes, ‘[n]ever has there been such an abyss between 
the real world and the idea as there is today. Never has this abyss been so loaded with 
tragic, grotesque, destructive tensions. Our previous reality lies smashed on the 
ground, and above it the ideal image of a new fully rationalised world still rises far 
and high.’19 She focuses here on two separate realities and places her fantastic art at 
neither one side of the abyss nor the other, but demonstrating the difference between 
the two sides, mirroring and warning. This is a visual evocation, using spatial 
metaphor – the abyss, the soaring ideal above the broken reality – and a 
communication through art, visionary imaginative art, the art of dreamers. Other 
statements that Höch made about her work show that empathy is an important aspect 
of her intention. In a 1929 gallery text Höch explains that, ‘[t]he more vitality, the 
stronger intuition and deeper empathy underlying the artwork, the more strongly it 
will speak to us.’20 The term empathy is used here explicitly to describe an underlying 
process preceding the communication and presentation of ideas. Although empathy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Peter Barth, ed., Die Fantstische Welt der Hannah Höch: Die Puppe Balsamine und der 
Zauberbusch (Düsseldorf: Galerie Remmert und Barth, 2008), 11–14. My translation.  
20 Hannah Höch, 1929, in Ralf Burmeister and Eckhard Fürlus, eds., Hannah Höch: Eine 
Lebenscollage 1921-1945. Band II. Abteilung 2 (Berlin: Berlinische Galerie, 1995), 365. Translated in 
Burmeister and Fürlus from Dutch to German: Je mehr Lebendigkeit, je stärkere Intuition und tiefere 
Einfühlung dem Kunstwerk zugrunde liegen, desto stärker wird es zu uns sprechen, unabhängig davon, 
zu welcher Zeit oder zu welchem >>ismus<< es gehört. 
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underlies the work, it is the work that speaks to us and which we experience. If the 
exhibition is thought of as an analogy for the representation of mental images, the 
creation of art and its exhibition could be seen to function in a similar way to my 
proposed model for imagination: by transforming the deep feelings underlying the 
work into an experienceable form. In the exhibition, as in imagination, mental images 
are presented to experience (or to the viewer in an exhibition) and they have a history, 
which we may not be directly aware of. For Höch to break down and re-construct 
culturally shared ideas of reality relies on both imagination and empathy. Realities 
can be shared through social groups, involving empathy as part of the connections 
between people’s imaginations. Höch expressed a wish to use her imagination as a 
bridge to change the way people engage with the world. To this end, empathy is both 
the hoped-for outcome and the necessary precondition, and imagination is the method.  
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